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Abstract
The paper builds a general model of vote transfer systems on the basis of the
current Hungarian electoral rules. It combines single-seat districts and list man-
dates with three possible compensation rule for ’wasted’ votes in constituencies: no
compensation (direct vote transfer, DVT), compensation for votes cast for losing
party candidates (positive vote transfer, PVT) and compensation for all votes that
are not necessary to win the district (negative vote transfer, NVT).
The model is studied in the case of two parties. When the number of votes for
the majority party follows a uniform distribution in each district, DVT results in
the greatest expected seat share, however, application of PVT, and, especially, NVT
increases the probability of winning the election. The trade-off between vote transfer
formulas and the number of list mandates reveals that the majority party should
use an appropriately calibrated NVT system if it focuses on these two variables.
Keywords: Electoral system; mixed-member system; vote transfer; two-party sys-
tem; Hungary
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1 Introduction
Mixed-member electoral systems combine direct election of representatives with the aim
of a proportional (or, at least more proportional) seat allocation. In this category, most
works are devoted to mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral systems (Massicotte and Blais,
1999; Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001), while other correction mechanisms attracted less
attention from academics.
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This paper will discuss a close relative of mixed-member proportional systems, the so-
called vote transfer system. They involve two electoral tiers, one consisting of single-seat
districts (SSDs) and a second consisting of list seats with a potential compensation for
the votes unused in the first tier. Vote transfer systems may have two advantages over
common MMP rules: they seem to be more simple and intuitive (for example, there is
no need for overhang seats) and they are immune to some kind of strategic manipulation
such as list-splitting (Bochsler, 2014).
On the other side, if there are too many compensation seats relative to single-seat
districts, a vote-transfer system gives robust incentives for strategic behaviour of the
parties and may lead to controversial election outcomes. Furthermore, this design is
inevitable in order to provide a fully proportional outcome (Bochsler, 2015). Accordingly,
vote transfer systems can be suggested as an option just for increasing proportionality
while retaining district representation (Raabe, 2015).
Probably, it was an important cause of adopting a similar scheme in Hungary during
the democratic transition. The country used an especially complex version of positive
vote transfer (PVT) system from 1990 to 2010 (Benoit, 2001; Benoit and Schiemann,
2001), meaning that parties get a compensation for votes cast for their losing candidates
in constituencies. Since there were different (territorial and national) party lists with
their own divisor for converting votes into seats, it suffered from the population paradox,
namely, some parties might lose by getting more votes or by the opposition obtaining
fewer votes (Tasna´di, 2008).
After the governing party alliance won a two-thirds (super)majority in the 2010 elec-
tion, the electoral rules were fundamentally rewritten in 2012: besides a reduction of the
number of single-member districts (an issue investigated by Biro´ et al. (2015)), the pro-
portional representation pillar was significantly simplified. While vote transfer remained
an essential part of the system, its calculation was also modified by the introduction of
negative vote transfer (NVT), that is, in addition to compensation due to votes for los-
ing party candidates, the party of the victorious candidate receives the vote difference
between the its candidate and the runner-up, too.
This change inspired us to compare different vote transfer formulas. Besides the
above mentioned PVT and NVT, the total lack of compensation for ’wasted’ SSD votes
is also examined under the name of direct vote transfer (DVT). Despite it immediately
excludes to achieve clear proportionality, in a number of settings DVT may be functionally
equivalent to PVT or NVT with an appropriate choice of the number of list mandates.
For this purpose, a mathematical model of the current Hungarian electoral system is
built. All candidates in SSDs are associated with a party, list votes are calculated as the
sum of votes in SSDs plus possible compensation according to the vote transfer formula
DVT, PVT, or NVT. Share of mandates from SSDs can be chosen arbitrarily.
The model is studied in the case of two parties. Analytical results can be derived if
the number of SSDs won is extremely distorted for either party. They show that NVT is
better than PVT, while DVT is the most risky for the majority party. When the number
of votes for the majority party follows a uniform distribution, its expected seat share can
also be derived analytically, but its chance to get a majority is examined by a simulation.
It turns out that DVT results in the greatest expected seat share, however, application of
PVT, and, especially, NVT increases the probability of winning the election. The trade-
off between vote transfer formulas and the number of list mandates is investigated, too,
revealing that the majority party should use an appropriately calibrated NVT system if
it aims these two variables.
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model and Section 3 discusses
its properties in a two-party system. Subsection 3.1 deals with the cases where exact
derivation is possible, and Subsection 3.2 uses a simulation to address further issues. Main
analytical results are formulated in Propositions 1-3, and a conclusion of simulations is
presented in Observation 1. Finally, Section 4 summarizes the limitations of the model
and possibilities for its extension.
2 The model
Vote transfer systems allocate parliamentary seats in two tiers. One part of mandates
can be obtained in single-member constituencies under the majority (first-past-the-post)
rule, while the other tier contains some compensatory seats to approach proportionality.
Theoretically, this system is able to deliver a fully proportional seat allocation, however,
it depends not only on the weight of the second tier but on the behaviour of parties and
voters (Bochsler, 2014). It may also require such a large number of compensatory seats
that parties can find rational to try to lose some districts in order to gain a stronger
representation overall (Raabe, 2015).
Nevertheless, vote transfer systems should not necessarily aim proportionality. They
may be used to create a parliament without a too fragmented party structure (a potential
failure of truly proportional systems), and, at the same time, avoid the domination of
majority.
We formulate a mathematical model of a general vote transfer system, which is able
to give any seat allocation between pure proportional and strictly majoritarian electoral
outcomes. The main assumptions are as follows:
• It is a mixed-member electoral system with single-seat districts and list seats.
All voter has only one vote.1 All local candidates are associated with a party.
Voters are identified by their party vote.
• SSDs are won by the party whose candidate get the most votes. Districts have
an equal size.
• List seats are allocated according to the proportional rule. The voting weights
of the parties can be arbitrary (that is, not only integers) in order to eliminate
the effects of the apportionment rule used.
• There exists no threshold for the parties to pass in order to be eligible for list
seats.
• The allocation of list mandates is based on the aggregated number of votes
cast for the candidates of each party plus optional correction votes from SSDs.
Three different transfer formulas are investigated:
a) Direct vote transfer (DVT): there are no correction votes;
b) Positive vote transfer (PVT): in addition to the number of list votes
under DVT, parties also get the votes of their candidates who lost in
SSDs;
1 Another interpretation can be that there are two votes on separate ballots for each voter, but
vote-splitting is not allowed.
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c) Negative vote transfer (NVT): in addition to the number of list votes un-
der PVT, parties also get the ’wasted’ votes of their victorious candidates,
that is, the vote difference between the candidate and the runner-up.
• Share of mandates available in SSDs is α ∈ [0, 1].
Example 1 illustrates this electoral system.
Example 1. Consider an election between two parties (A and B) and two districts:
Number of voters Votes for party A Votes for party B
District 1 100 65 35
District 2 100 45 55
National 200 110 90
Each party wins one mandate in the first tier, party A obtains District 1 and party B
gains District 2.
Let α = 0.6. Then seat allocation according to the three transfer formulas is as follows:
Party A Party B
National vote share 110/200 = 55% 90/200 = 45%
Mandate share in SSDs 1/2 = 50% 1/2 = 50%
DVT
Direct list votes 110 90
List vote share 55% 45%
Seat share 52% 48%
PVT
Direct list votes 110 90
Losing list votes 45 35
List vote share 155/280 ≈ 55.36% 125/280 ≈ 44.64%
Seat share ≈ 52.14% ≈ 47.86%
NVT
Direct list votes 110 90
Losing list votes 45 35
Wasted list votes 65− 35 = 30 55− 45 = 10
List vote share 185/320 = 57.8125% 135/320 = 42.1875%
Seat share 53.125% 46.875%
In the case of DVT, list votes are simply the number of votes across all SSDs. In the
case of PVT, some indirect votes are added to this pool, namely, votes that do not win a
seat, which is 35 for party B in District 1 and 45 for party A in District 2. In the case
of NVT, ’wasted’ votes of the victorious candidates (the difference of votes between the
two candidates) in SSDs are also added, which is 30 for party A in District 1 and 10 for
party B in District 2.
Mandate share in SSDs and list vote shares are aggregated by a weighted sum based
on parameter α. For instance, party B obtains 0.6× 50%+ 0.4× 42.1875% = 46.875% of
seats under NVT.
Note that party A is under-represented in SSDs compared to its national vote share, so
it benefits from a smaller α in all cases since list votes somewhat adjusts this disproportion.
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Formulas DVT, PVT and NVT gradually approximate proportionality. However, their
’complexity’ also rises: in DVT, list votes are not influenced by the distribution of votes
among the constituencies; in PVT, list votes depend on the number of losing votes, that
is, which party has won; and in NVT, list votes are affected by the number of votes of
the winner and the runner-up.
3 Study of the model
This section investigates the model above in the case of two parties.
3.1 Analytical results
Let the vote share of the majority party be x ∈ (0.5; 1). Since x is fixed, the election
outcome is deterministic if α = 0 (only list votes count). However, voters of the party
may be distributed arbitrarily among the districts, affecting the number of SSDs won.
Then seat allocation can be derived analytically in two extreme cases.
According to the first scenario, the majority party wins all districts, which is possible
as it has more than 50% of votes at national level. Then list votes are as follows:
Majority party Other party
Direct list votes x 1− x
Losing list votes 0 1− x
Wasted list votes x− (1− x) = 2x− 1 0
List vote share (DVT) x 1− x
List vote share (PVT) x/(2− x) (2− 2x)/(2− x)
List vote share (NVT) (3x− 1)/(1 + x) (2− 2x)/(1 + x)
It implies the following result.
Proposition 1. Consider a two-party system where the majority party wins all districts.
The majority party’s preference order on vote transfer formulas is DVT ≻ NVT ≻ PVT.
Proof. Note that
x >
x
1 + (1− x)
=
x
2− x
and
3x− 1
1 + x
=
x+ (2x− 1)
(2− x) + (2x− 1)
>
x
2− x
,
so DVT and NVT are more favourable for the majority party than PVT. Furthermore,
x >
3x− 1
1 + x
⇔ (x− 1)2 > 0,
hence the majority party has the preference order DVT ≻ NVT ≻ PVT.
The second extremity is when the majority party (marginally) loses as many districts
as possible, that is, the ratio of constituencies lost equals to 2(1−x).2 Then list votes are
as follows:
2 For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that 2(1− x) times the number of SSDs is an integer.
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Majority party Other party
Direct list votes x 1− x
Losing list votes 1− x 0
Wasted list votes x− (1− x) = 2x− 1 0
List vote share (DVT) x 1− x
List vote share (PVT) 1/(2− x) (1− x)/(2− x)
List vote share (NVT) 2x/(1 + x) (1− x)/(1 + x)
It implies the following result, analogous to Proposition 1.
Proposition 2. Consider a two-party system where the majority party loses as many
districts as possible. The majority party’s preference order on vote transfer formulas is
NVT ≻ PVT ≻ DVT.
Proof. Note that
x <
x+ (1− x)
1 + (1− x)
=
1
2− x
<
1 + (2x− 1)
2− x+ (2x− 1)
=
2x
1 + x
,
so the majority party has the preference order NVT ≻ PVT ≻ DVT.
Naturally, it has a low probability that any of these extremities occur in practice.
Nevertheless, the analysis yields at least two lessons for the majority party, which may be
generalized: DVT results in the greatest variance of seat share, and NVT may be better
than PVT.
Finally, a simple stochastic case is analysed, first for the expected vote share of the
majority party.
Proposition 3. Consider a two-party system where the vote share of the majority party
in each SSD has a continuous uniform distribution over the interval from k − h to k + h
(the expected value is k) and 0.5 < k < 0.5 + h. The majority party’s preference order on
vote transfer formulas with respect to its expected seat share is DVT ≻ NVT ≻ PVT.
Proof. Based on the properties of uniform distribution, the following table can be filled
out for the majority party:
Probability of winning an SSD: π =
1
2
+
k − 0.5
2h
Probability of losing an SSD: 1− π =
1
2
−
k − 0.5
2h
Expected vote share in an SSD won: β =
0.5 + k + h
2
Expected vote share in an SSD lost: γ =
0.5 + k − h
2
Expected vote difference in an SSD won: ∆ = k + h− 0.5
Expected vote difference in an SSD lost: ∇ = 0.5− k + h
Denote by ℓi the expected share of the majority party from list votes under vote transfer
formula i ∈ {DV T ;PV T ;NV T}. Then the majority party’s expected seat share is si =
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Figure 1: Comparison of vote transfer formulas for expected list vote share
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απ+ (1−α)ℓi. For a given k and h, only ℓi depends on the vote transfer formula applied
in the following way:
ℓDV T = k
ℓP V T =
k + (1− π)γ
1 + (1− π)γ + π(1− β)
ℓNV T =
k + (1− π)γ + π∆
1 + (1− π)γ + π(1− β) + π∆+ (1− π)∇
.
Despite the complicated expressions, it can be seen that ℓP V T < ℓNV T < ℓDV T , illustrated
by Figure 1.
Uniform distribution can be regarded as a standard case, when no party has an exces-
sive power in any district (or the ratio of party strongholds is approximately proportional
to their vote share). Then Proposition 3 shows that lack of compensation (DVT) is the
most favourable for the majority party. It remains to be seen whether further considera-
tions may modify this conclusion.
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3.2 Simulation results
Sometimes the expected vote share has a modest importance provided that the election
is won. Therefore, 50% can be a natural threshold: a party may be interested in the
expected chance of winning the majority of seats.
It is not attempted to derive the exact probability of this even under the restrictive
assumption of uniformly distributed votes in SSDs. Therefore, simulations were carried
out to get more insight into the effects of vote transfer formulas.
Assumption 1. The main assumptions of the calculations are as follows:
• There are 100 single-seat districts and m mandates allocated on party lists.
• The vote share of the majority party in each SSD has a continuous uniform
distribution over the interval from k − h to k + h (implying that the expected
value is k).
In the simulation, 1 million runs were carried out for every value of h ∈ {0.1; 0.2} and
k such that 100k is an integer and 0.5 < k < 0.5 + h. Election outcomes were analysed
in the case m ∈ {20; 25; 30; . . . ; 100} (that is, α ∈ {0.8333; 0.8; 0.7692; . . . ; 0.5}). We have
focused on the average seat share of the majority party, and the number of runs when the
party obtains a majority (defined as more than 50% of the seats).
Table 1: Simulation results: α = 0.5 (m = 100); h = 0.1
Value of k (expected value) 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.55
Average vote share 0.51000 0.51999 0.53001 0.53999 0.55000
Average seat share (DVT) 0.52999 0.55997 0.59007 0.61994 0.65001
Average seat share (PVT) 0.52154 0.54307 0.56467 0.58609 0.60761
Average seat share (NVT) 0.52499 0.54998 0.57506 0.59996 0.62501
Majority: all rules 864107 985589 999636 999996 1000000
Majority: PVT and NVT 7516 3359 135 1 0
Majority: DVT and NVT 0 0 0 0 0
Majority: DVT and PVT 9 0 0 0 0
Majority: only DVT 1 0 0 0 0
Majority: only PVT 0 0 0 0 0
Majority: only NVT 10928 2661 103 1 0
Minority 117439 8391 126 2 0
The case α = 0.5 and h = 0.1 is detailed in Table 1 for various values of k. The first
row shows the expected, and the second row shows the average vote share of the majority
party. They are approximately equal due to the great number of simulation runs. In the
subsequent three rows, one can see the average seat share according to the three vote
transfer formulas, which can be cross-checked with the theoretical value derived in the
proof of Proposition 3. Due to the large number of runs, they are also very close.
Finally, the last 8 rows highlight the number of cases with respect to winning a majority
of seats. In most runs, the majority party wins the election under all vote transfer formulas,
but – due to the stochastic nature of votes – it may happen that a large number of SSDs,
therefore the whole election is lost. Nevertheless, sometimes list votes can compensate it.
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There exists no run such that only PVT leads to a favourable election outcome. Fur-
thermore, NVT almost dominates PVT, and PVT almost dominates DVT from this point
of view. For example, in the case of k = 0.52, 14898 elections are lost under DVT, 11373
are lost under PVT, and 8782 are lost under NVT. It is a remarkable difference.
Figure 2: Comparison of vote transfer formulas by simulation
(a) α = 0.5 (m = 100); h = 0.1
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(b) α = 0.5 (m = 100); h = 0.2
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(c) α = 0.625 (m = 60); h = 0.1
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(d) α = 0.625 (m = 60); h = 0.2
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0.65
Average seat share (right scale): DVT PVT NVT
Net advantage over DVT (left log scale, max. 106): PVT NVT
These conclusions are reinforced by further simulations for various values of h and m,
some of them presented in Figure 2. Here the lines (and the right scale) show the average
seat share under the three vote transfer formulas, which can be derived from Proposition 3.
On the other hand, the bars (and the left scale) measure the net advantage over DVT:
the number of runs when PVT and NVT results in a majority, but DVT gets a minority,
minus the number of runs when DVT results in a majority, but PVT and NVT gets a
minority, respectively. For example, in the case of α = 0.5, h = 0.1 and k = 0.51, the
net advantage of PVT over DVT is 7515 = 7516 − 1, while the net advantage of NVT
over DVT is 18435 = 7516 + 10928− 17 − 1 on the basis of Table 1. Note that a small
difference between the bars for PVT and NVT indicates a significant advantage of NVT
due to the logarithmic scale.
On the basis of simulations, the comparison of vote transfer formulas – discussed by
Proposition 3 from the viewpoint of expected seat share – can be refined.
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Observation 1. Consider a two-party system where the vote share of the majority party
in each SSD has a continuous uniform distribution over the interval from k − h to k + h
(the expected value is k) and 0.5 < k < 0.5 + h. The majority party’s preference order
on vote transfer formulas with respect to its chance to get a majority is NVT ≻ PVT ≻
DVT.
Proposition 3 and Observation 1 support the conclusions derived analytically for the
extreme cases in Propositions 1 and 2: application of DVT (despite it leads to the largest
expected seat share) is a risky strategy for the majority party because of the diminished
probability of winning the election, and NVT seems to dominate PVT from both aspects
examined.
Finally, it is possible to outline some trade-offs between the three vote transfer formulas.
Assume that the majority party focuses on its chance to obtain a majority of seats. Then,
in the case of h = 0.1 (low variance across SSDs), the majority party is approximately
indifferent among NVT with m = 55 (α = 100/155 ≈ 0.6452), PVT with m = 75
(α = 100/175 ≈ 0.5714), and DVT with m = 100 (α = 0.5) list mandates.
Figure 3: Expected seat share in systems with the same chance to get a majority
(a) h = 0.1
0.51 0.52 0.53 0.54
0.55
0.6
(b) h = 0.2
0.52 0.54 0.56
0.55
0.6
DVT (m = 100) PVT (m = 75) NVT (m = 55)
How they perform with respect to expected vote share, calculated in Proposition 3?
According to Figure 3.a, NVT with m = 55 list mandates is the most favourable for the
majority party both from the aspects of expected vote share and (marginally) its chance
to get a majority. Figure 3.b shows that the same preferences apply in the case of h = 0.2
(high variance across SSDs).
To summarize, the majority party should use an appropriately calibrated NVT system
in this model, if it concentrates on its average (expected) vote share and its chance to win
the election.
4 Conclusion
The paper has surveyed a model of vote transfer systems in order to compare three
different compensation mechanisms. Significant restrictions were necessary in order to to
derive mathematically correct implications, including the identification of all candidates
with a party, the assumption of no election threshold, and, most worryingly, the focus on
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a two party competition. Nevertheless, there remain unexplored issues even in this simple
framework, for example, increasing the robustness of simulations or a deeper study of the
trade-off among the three vote transfer formulas.
Regarding generalization, perhaps the most exciting question is whether these results
can be extended for more parties. It is obvious that our conclusions do not change if the
two-party system is valid only on the level of SSDs (for example, there are two regional
parties which do not compete against each other in constituencies). Since the model does
not contain any discontinuity, their list votes and number of mandates in SSDs can be
added.
However, if there exist at least one constituency with three parties, the derivation
of analytical results seems to be practically impossible. Simulations are also difficult to
carry out, because at least two independent random variables should be introduced for
each constituency and a lot of possibilities can be found to determine their correlation.
For instance, it can occur that the third party has no chance to win a constituency, but it
may also be a strong regional party which is a clear favorite in some districts. Therefore,
due to the large number of scenarios in an election with at least three parties, this topic
is left for future research.
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